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Happiness as a Measurement and Goal of Peacebuilding
Abstract
The Global Peace Index (GPI) measures how while the World Happiness
Report (WHR) index
the two sets of findings conspicuously do not match apparently indicating that people who 
live in peace do not always live in happiness. To grapple with this interesting dissonance, let us
assume that happiness is the ultimate goal in life as proposed by the Benthamite philosophy
and that peace is therefore an instrumental good, much like health, freedom and autonomy. 
Once this is taken on principle, it follows that peacebuilding should be to make 
sure conflict-affected communities are happy. This paper investigates what the results of
peacebuilding would look like if they were measured using the GPI and WHR at the same time. 
Using the former Yugoslavia countries as a case study, it asks whether
conflict experiences of peacebuilding can help explain their WHR and GPI results. The intention
-
is to start a meaningful debate on what overall objective should be and to 
examine whether the measurement of happiness could be a useful starting point.1 
1. Introduction
peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and
. To construct a measure of 
progress towards this goal, its framers established 23 indicators for its 12 target areas.2 In fact, 
the ongoing UN-level conversation about how to measure peace and related complex concepts
encompasses a number of regional and global initiatives, among them the Strategic 
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Harmonization of Statistics in Africa (SHaSA) as well as various household surveys on conflict, 
social cohesion, displacement and so on, many of which have been undertaken by humanitarian
and development NGOs for decades. Yet there is still no consensus on how to measure such
complex conditions as peace, development and happiness; the search for these measures has
been not only difficult, but also contentious.
One of the key initiatives that aims to measure peace is the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks
. The index has come in for plenty of criticism, with
some saying it fails to understand or to accurately present how peace is experienced by different 
populations across the world.3 Mac Ginty also gives a critique of
preferred peace indicators; he criticises them for using unclear measures, restricting themselves
to the narrow scope of peacebuilding projects, excluding conflict-
inputs, missing subtle differences within and between communities, and for mounting top-
down projects originated from the global north.4 
However fair these criticisms might be, any attempt to measure any social phenomenon will to 
some extent be similarly afflicted. For the purposes of this paper, it could be broadly accepted
that when it comes to achieving sustainable peace in conflict-affected environments, the GPI 
indices offer fair representations of contemporary peacebuilding . That said,
conceiving of as measured by the GPI leaves a big question unanswered: what is
the ultimate goal of building a sustainable peace?
This paper proposes that that ultimate goal is happiness. From a utilitarian perspective, 
happiness is the ultimate goal of life; it follows that successful peacebuilding can be measured
2 of 34
 





    
 
    
     
   
       
     
    




   
    
    
   
        
 
 
by the same standard. To that The 
Greatest Happiness, which will be discussed in the greater detail later in the paper.
Before going any further, it is important to note that this paper does not necessarily advocate 
the utilitarian perspective is the only better way to measure peacebuilding . There are 
other options. Where utilitarianism measures subjective well-being,
takes as its main criterion to achieve the kind of lives they have 
reason to value.5 Michael Ignatieff has recently developed what he calls an
approach, which explains that the moral language of everyday virtues trust, forgiveness, 
tolerance, resilience resonates with most people far more deeply than the legal lexicon of 
human rights.6 These are only two of many competing philosophical perspectives, all of which
could contribute to the debate over peacebuilding This paper is therefore purely an
interrogation of happiness as a useful measure of peacebuilding . 
To do this, the paper questions whether the World Happiness Report (WHR) index could be used
alongside the GPI to measure post-conflict achievements. In other words, the overall aim here is
to explore how the results of peacebuilding efforts look when evaluated using the GPI and WHR
simultaneously. Where do the two indic and differ, and why? Might such
similarities and differences say anything meaningful about the way peacebuilding is practiced
today? To put it another way: if a given post-conflict country sees its happiness gradually 
improve, might that be attributed to the achievements of peacebuilding and conversely, if its




    
      




    
      
       
    
        
 
     
     
  
      
 
    




       
     
  
 
Obviously, all these questions come with a major caveat: concepts such as peace and happiness
are highly complex, and establishing a simple correlation between them may not be possible. 
For example, there will always be an attribution gap on whether a particular input such as 
peacebuilding intervention leads to a particular outcome such as peace or happiness. 
Exogenous factors such as the global economy or geo-political issues might also be playing a
role on the r it may be linked to the political mood in that country all
things that have little to do with peacebuilding. This paper does not try to present such
correlations so. Instead, its main goal is simply to start a meaningful debate on what we should
take as peacebuilding whether a measurement of happiness no matter 
how imperfect and difficult to pin down could be a useful starting point for the discussion.
The paper starts by briefly exploring the key terminology of peace, peacebuilding and
happiness. It then introduces the GPI and WHR, explaining what they measure and how; using 
the countries of the former Yugoslavia as a case study, it then analyses how the GPI and WHR 
compare with each other as measures of peacebuilding. It goes on to ask whether these 
with reference to their post-conflict 
peacebuilding experiences. Finally, the paper conclusions examine the implications of
measuring peacebuilding outcomes using the WHR alongside the GPI, and ask whether or not its
indices could and should inform the work of building peace in conflict-affected environments.
2. Peace and Happiness
Peace is not just the absence of armed conflict.7 It is a broad and elusive concept, and is
understood differently by different cultures, actors and political tendencies. It is often used with
reference to a range of other concepts, among them harmony, stability, security, truce, order, 
justice, repose, friendship, trust, truth, love, beauty, serenity, contentment, rights, and freedom.8 
4 of 34
 
    
  
  
   
    
     
      
  
  
   
 
    
  
   




    
   
   




It is also used at different levels: inner peace at the individual level, harmonious relationships at 
family and societal levels, and peace among communities and between states.9 When it comes
to political violence, peace can also be conceptualised in all sorts of different ways. Miller 
pictures it frozen, cold, normal and warm.10 At the level, the main
issues of conflict remain unresolved, and different conflict actors seldom if ever communicate or
collaborate. At the level, by contrast, conflict issues have been resolved and transcended;
communities share highly developed ties and actively collaborate, and the possibility of 
returning to war is unthinkable.11 conceptualises peace as a 
process of transformation, not a static end goal.
Other authors have also used models that revolve around transformative processes; Galtung 
uses , which he defines as
, , which does not have an agreed definition.12 Barash and
Webel define it mised or eliminated and in
which there is neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of underlying structural
violence'.13 Reardon takes it to be -
psychological, direct-indirect, explicit-implicit and individual-structural.14 
typology of violence as direct, cultural and structural, meanwhile, offers a clearer way to explain
transitions from negative to positive peace; positive peace implies safety from violence, positive 
relationships between social actors, fair and equal treatment of all social constituents, 
their interdependency.15 According to this definition, the process of transforming a conflict 
would mean promoting reconciliation between conflicting parties and building nonviolent 
patterns of behaviour through empathetic understanding.16 
5 of 34
 
    
   
    
  

















Peacebuilding can be conceptualised as the pursuit of durable peace via peace-supporting 
activities that address the root causes of armed conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War, this has 
become one of the main approaches to peace interventions.17 In peacebuilding, the main
referent of security is people and not solely states18; it aims to change not only institutional and
19 Moreover, the 
peacebuilding approach can be employed not only in the aftermath of armed conflict, but as a 
preventative intervention to make sure armed conflict does not break out in the first place.
Contemporary post-settlement peacebuilding entails a wide range of relief, reconstruction and
reconciliation activities. Humanitarian assistance is provided to vulnerable groups; governance 
structures are re-established; security apparatuses are reformed; infrastructure, housing and
services are rebuilt; the economy is salvaged; the rule of law and justice is secured; and an
environment of dialogue and reconciliation for harmonious societal relations is fostered.20 
But if we think of peacebuilding as a list of discrete technocratic interventions, we risk missing 
the bigger picture of peacebuilding and what it tries to achieve. Instead, while bearing in mind
these myriad activities and actors, it is important to remember that successful peacebuilding 
begins with a central aim: the transformation of the factors that underpinned a conflict in the 
first place. As Lederach puts it, 
the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change'.21 
To realise these life-giving opportunities, conflict transformation works in four main dimensions:
the actor-related, the relational, the structural and the cultural.
Thinking in terms of these four dimensions makes it easier to articulate what peacebuilding aims
to achieve. First of all, actor-related transforma key 
things that motivate them to act, things such as sense of identity, emotions and life goals. 
6 of 34
 




     
 
 
    
   
   
  
   









     
Transformation on this level can help facilitate psychosocial programmes, heal the societal 
wounds of armed conflict, and resolve disputes over resources, politics and local conflicts. 
Relational transformation, meanwhile, addresses affectivity, power and interdependence of 
human relationships. This can entail efforts from peace education to inter-faith dialogue to
gender-focused micro-credit income generation programmes.
The third dimension, structural transformation, recognises that relationships do not exist in a
vacuum. In any group, conflict is fomented and resolved with reference to dominant patterns of
discourses, norms, rules, regulations, distribution systems, social interaction parameters, 
treatment of demographic characteristics, and so on. Structural peacebuilding efforts, then, 
focus on institutions, political, social, economic and cultural arrangements, and the overall
political economy of relations. Finally, cultural transformation forms the overall context for
peacebuilding; in any conflict, initiation, mobilisation, deterrence and resolution will all be 
influenced by the cultural characteristics of the surrounding environment.22 
With such a multi-dimensional transformation process in mind, how should we measure the 
peace that results? Some authors argue that many peacebuilding responses have been informed
and professionalisation efforts, and have 
focused too narrowly on institutions and infrastructure rather than the social needs of
way of building peace.23 
Mac Ginty recommends some arguing that they 
-the-ground situation in a textured way that is meaningful 
24 He has developed his pointing to the
7 of 34
 
    
   
 
   






   
  
  
   
    
  
   
  
 
   
  
fluidity of the social world, the heterogeneity of conflict-affected communities, and the 
importance of context and the way it informs the emergence and sustainability of peace25; he 
he practices and norms deployed by individuals and groups in
deeply divided societies to avoid and minimize conflict and awkward situations at both inter-
and intra- 26 Other authors have critiqued technocratic intervention too; in her
seminal book Reclaiming Everyday Peace, Firchow explores the effectiveness of -
interventions by the international community, and concludes that there is in fact, no direct 
correlation between the number of external interventions and the peacefulness of post-conflict 
communities. She argues that this is largely because contemporary post-conflict interventions
primarily target governance, security and development, rather than focusing on healing 
community relations.27 
But it is also important not to . Many of the root causes of conflicts
might be found in societal injustices, with certain gender, age, ethnic, religious and other socio­
demographic and economic groups excluded from local decision-making systems. Efforts to 
open up local participation, as advocated by Firchow, would also require a deliberate strategy to 
build the capacities of disadvantaged and marginalised groups in order for them to get their
voices heard and subsequently, to make sure that external interventions are undertaken with
their voices included.28 And to take the point further, peacebuilding does not end with the 
termination of formal peacebuilding projects and programmes. Conflict-affected communities
can employ their own responses to avoid conflict and maintain the environment of peace 
through transformation for years after formal interventions come to an end.
While it is certainly important to question what transformative peacebuilding should aim to 
address in a society torn apart by conflict, it is also important to ask what the resulting
8 of 34
 
    
   
   
    
  
 
    
  
   
 
   











society should look like and how its condition should be assessed. These are not easy questions 
to answer. Because the transformation approach is about a dynamic and continuous process
rather than a static end, it is hard to identify a result to measure. This is where
The Greatest Happiness principle can be introduced.
The principle states that as a matter of fact the ultimate aim at which all human
actions are directed and that it is therefore the ultimate standard by which to judge the rightness
or wrongness of actions 29 As a lawyer, Bentham wanted to establish the theoretical foundations
of a perfect system of law and government, and for this he needed a value for such perfection. 
His principle of utility or The Greatest Happiness holds
As he writes in The Principles of Morals and Legislation:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of
causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in
all we think.
30 Deepening the Benthamite 
understanding of happiness in On Liberty 
sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of 
other people) is an existence as free as possible from pain and as rich as possible in
31 Mill argues that happiness is about not only quantity, but also the quality of 
9 of 34
 



















intellectual and moral on one hand and the physical on the other. In Utilitarianism, Mill states
that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, making a judgment over how
people could come to a deeper understanding of happiness through education and
experience.32 
But what of other goods such as freedom, health, autonomy and accomplishment? According to 
-evidently good. If 
health, a - we can give further, more ultimate
33 
uments
around the qualities of happiness, its consequentialism, fairness, adaptation, expediency, and so
on.
Overall, the Benthamite philosophy offers us a useful framework in which happiness is the 
ultimate goal; with that in mind, this paper can begin to question how well the contemporary 
understanding of peacebuilding and its practice contributes to achieving it. But to investigate 
whether peacebuilding serves the ultimate goal of happiness in societies affected by armed
conflict, we first have to interrogate the means by which peace and happiness can be measured. 
Also, it is important to note that as explained in our conceptual exploration, happiness is clearly 
in the realm of positive peace, and it should not be seen as a luxury or somehow superfluous in a
conflict-affected society where people deserve the bare minimum assistance for them to survive, 
3. The Global Peace Index (GPI) and the World Happiness Report (WHR)
10 of 34
 
    
 
 
    
  
   

















people about their happiness in a long-term sense; as he puts it34 
and care mainly about our average happiness over a longish period of time. But that average is
35 underlined by Layard is
particularly important. It is subjective and difficult to measure, which brings us into the 
immaterial sphere. Humans are affective and emotional beings who operate in a social
environment. With such understanding that this section focuses on the GPI and WHR as 
measurements of peace and happiness, respectively.
The GPI has been produced by the Institute for Economic and Peace (IEP) since 2007, and ranks
countries according to their peacefulness. In its 2018 report, 163 countries were included in the 
survey, using 23 indicators.36 The index takes measurements across three domains; the extent of
Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict (indices 1-6); the level of Societal Safety and
Security (7-16); and the degree of Militarisation (18-23). Among its various sources of data are 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the UN Survey of Criminal 
Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. All scores for each indicator 
are banded or normalised on a scale of 1-5; qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings, 
while quantitative ones are either banded into ten groupings or rounded to the first decimal 
point.37 The 10 most peaceful and 10 least peaceful countries in 2018 are presented in Table 138:
Table 1 in here
11 of 34
 






















The WHR, meanwhile has been published by the UN since 2012 (with the exception of 2014), 
and presents a ranking of national happiness. It was initiated after the UN High Level Meeting:
Well-being and Happiness, which outlined the state of world happiness, causes of happiness and
misery, and policy implications. The annual report draws its data primarily from the Gallup World
Poll and World Values Survey. For its 2018 happiness ranking, it used the following variables: 
GDP per capita, healthy life expectancy, social support, freedom to make life choices, generosity, 
and corruption.39 These combined variables generate a population-weighted average score on a
scale from 0 to 10; this score is tracked over time and compared against other countries. Each
country is also compared against a hypothetical nation called Dystopia. Dystopia represents the 
lowest national averages for each key variable, and is (along with residual error) used as a
regression benchmark.40 
In 2018, the WHR ranked 156 countries by their happiness levels, and the 10 happiest and 10
unhappiest countries are presented in Table 2:41 
Table II in here
Before looking specifically at the countries of the former Yugoslavia, let us briefly compare the 
top and bottom 10 countries in both indices. First of all, there are a number of similarities at the 
higher end; Iceland, New Zealand, Denmark and Canada appear in the top 10 of both indices. 
But there are also some interesting anomalies. Singapore, for example, ranks at 8th place in the 
GPI, but 34th place in the WHR; Japan is 9th in the GPI but 54th in the WHR, while Portugal is 4th
on the GPI but 77th in the WHR. As for the bottom 10, once again, four countries appear at the 
end of both lists: the Central African Republic, Yemen, South Sudan and Syria. But again, there 
are anomalies: Libya (GPI:157, WHR:70), Somalia (GPI:159, WHR:98), and Tanzania (GPI:51, 
12 of 34
 

















WHR:153). Looking outside the top and bottom 10, there are other surprising differences. 
Botswana, which is ranked at 29th place on the GPI, occupies the 146th place in the WHR, just 
below Afghanistan. Several countries that rank relatively high on the WHR, such as Israel (11th), 
the US (19th), Colombia (37th) and Russia (59th), fare markedly worse in the GPI (146th, 121st, 
145th and 154th, respectively). Bhutan, on the other hand, which ranks a very respectable 19th
in the GPI, scores the 97th place in the WHR particularly interesting since it famously adopted
gross national happiness instead of gross domestic product as its main development indicator.
It is with these sorts of anomalies in mind that this paper makes case studies of former 
Yugoslavia countries, examining their experiences of peacefulness and happiness in a post-
conflict context. These countries were chosen principally for four reasons. First, given that this
paper is an inquiry into the long-term outcomes of peacebuilding efforts, the post-conflict 
experience in former Yugoslavia countries offers an ideal opportunity to compare peacefulness
and happiness trajectories in a meaningful way. Second, these countries were initially all part of
the same state, making them a highly distinctive set of post-conflict contexts. Third, in
comparison to many other conflict-affected environments, the former Yugoslavia countries 
ranked relatively high in the human development index before the armed conflicts of the 1990s
broke out; again, this provides a very useful baseline for exploring the impact of peacebuilding 
interventions. Finally, since the mid-1990s, the former Yugoslavia countries have received a 
significant level of international assistance and intervention for their reconstruction and
peacebuilding needs, meaning there are plenty of concrete efforts whose impact can be 
assessed.
4. Measuring Peace and Happiness in Former Yugoslavia Countries
13 of 34
 








   














Before its breakup, Yugoslavia consisted of six federal republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. It was a diverse country, with five nations
(Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes and Montenegrins; the Muslim population was also 
recognised as a nation ), four languages (Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian, 
Slovene and Albanian), three religions (Catholicism, Christian Orthodox, Islam) and two scripts
(Cyrillic and Latin).
The disintegration of Yugoslavia was triggered by the international recognition of Croatia and
Slovenia as independent states in mid-December 1991. The result was bloody ethno-religious 
conflict in several areas, though the civil war and its impact varied a great deal across the
different former Yugoslavia republics; in Slovenia it lasted a mere ten days, while in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the conflict lasted years and claimed more than 200,000 lives. The Dayton Peace 
Agreement of 1995 could be considered the end of the war in all republics, though there were 
further armed conflicts in Serbia province in 1999 and Macedonia in 2001. While Serbia 
and Montenegro remained a united country for a while, all six former Yugoslavia republics are 
now independent countries.42 Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008; for the 
purposes of this paper, it will be considered as a standalone former Yugoslavia country.
Since the Dayton Agreement is usually considered the start of a war-to-peace transition process
for most of the former Yugoslavia countries, this study will focus on peace and happiness
indicators since then. This is suitable for the purpose of this study, which aims to focus on the 
long-term outcomes of peace processes. The WHR is available for the dates of 2013, 2015, 2016, 
















   
 
   
   
     
  
      
 
    
   
   
   





The GPI results (Table 3)43 present an interesting narrative about how successful respective 
peace processes have been in former Yugoslavia countries since the mid-1990s and how they 
rank in the WHR (Table 4)44:
Table III in here
Table IV in here
Whether or not there are any significant correlations to draw here, the preliminary observations
from these two tables can be summarised as follows:
1.	 According to GPI, Slovenia is one of the most peaceful countries in the world today, but this
is not necessarily reflected in the country WHR ranking.
2.	 Similarly, Croatia seems to have achieved a good ranking in the GPI, but its population is
apparently similarly unhappy as its counterparts in Montenegro and Serbia, and not too 
much happier than the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina all countries that scored
much worse on the GPI. 
3.	 Comparing the WHR results for 2013 and 2018, Croatia and Slovenia have seen their scores
decline. As for the other former Yugoslavia countries, while there are some improvements, 
they are quite small. The greatest improvement can be observed in Serbia, which moved
from 106th to 78th.
4.	 According to the 2018 WHR, after Slovenia, the second happiest country of the former 
Yugoslavia was Kosovo. This is an interesting result considering that the peacebuilding 
15 of 34
 
    
   




   
  
  
    






   
  
 
   








process there started only in the early 2000s, and that the province is still going through the
turbulent political process of establishing independence from Serbia.
With those observations in mind, questions abound. Why have Slovenia and Croatia achieved
peace without becoming happier, and why has Serbia become happier while slipping 
backwards on peace measures? Why is Kosovo much happier than most of other countries in the
former Yugoslavia, even though it is still in a turbulent peacebuilding environment? To find
answers and deepen our discussions, we must also consider to what extent each country 
across the different WHR indicators affected its 2018 result. To that end, Table 5 presents the 
relative global ranking of each former Yugoslavia country for each of indicators:45 
Table V in here
GDP and Life Expectancy: The WHR 2018 rankings for GDP do not reveal any major differences
or unexpected anomalies. Amongst the seven former Yugoslavian countries, Slovenia and
Croatia are the richest while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are the poorest, but their GDP 
rankings are quite similar overall. All seven countries have similar rankings for life expectancy
except Kosovo, which ranks considerably lower than the others.
Social Support: Based on their population 
do you have relatives or friends you can count on to h 
Slovenia ranks high, with Serbia not too far behind. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
 
Croatia rank quite low. This might reflect the divisive impact of the long and bloody ethno­
16 of 34
 
    
  
  







   
     
  








      
religious conflicts both countries experienced; without making sweeping generalisations about 
the different wars, it might even be possible to say that the smaller impact of civil
war, the higher it ranks on social support, with Bosnia and Herzegovina lowest and Slovenia
highest. It must also be noted that the seven highest-ranking countries for this indicator 
(Australia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland) were also in the top 10
of the 2018 WHR.
Freedom to Make Life Choices: To get the results for this indicator, surveyed people are asked
Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life? 
national average of their binary answers is given. Apart from Slovenia, which achieved a very 
high ranking at 19th, all six of the other countries in the region ranked very low. The result for
Croatia (112th) is particularly puzzling; having scored high on the GPI while being more 
economically developed and a member of the European Union (EU), we might reasonably have 
expected a much higher ranking.
have puzzled researchers the world over. Without wanting to jump to conclusions, it is striking 
to note that its top 10 countries include Uzbekistan (1), Cambodia (2), and Somalia (7). 
Considering that Uzbekistan is an autocratic country and Somalia a war-torn one, these results
are somewhat surprising. It is also surprising to see democratic Greece in the bottom 10.
scope; all this discussion asks is that we consider the rankings for former Yugoslavia countries 
Generosity: This ranking is produced by regressing the national average of responses to the 
question of Have you donated money to a charity in the past month? against GDP per capita. 
The results are very interesting. It seems that some countries that score relatively low on the 
17 of 34
 




   
   
    
      
 
    
   
       
      
  
    
   
   
 
 
   
 
GDP indicator are in fact very generous; among the top 10 such countries as Myanmar (1), 
Indonesia (2), Haiti (3), Syria (5) and Bhutan (8). Meanwhile, the bottom 5 countries for this 
indicator were Azerbaijan, China, Morocco, Lithuania and Greece. There are plenty of potential
reasons for such results whether or not there is a cultural tradition of donating money to 
charities, for instance, or whether any religious obligations around almsgiving apply. But to take
the results at face value, it is notable that amongst the seven former Yugoslavia countries, the 
most generous one for charity seems to be Kosovo (26) and then Bosnia and Herzegovina (48). 
The other five all score relatively low on this indicator.
Perception of Corruption: The highest scorer on this ranking (i.e. the country whose citizens
is Singapore, and the others in top 10 are also 
more and less the same countries overall ranking. But there are some 
puzzles too. Rwanda ranks second on this indicator, even though it ranks 151st in the overall
index, and Somalia ranks 15th even though it ranked last among 180 surveyed countries in
Meanwhile, some EU member
countries, including Portugal, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania, find themselves in the 
bottom 10. The gap between these two indices might raise some questions about the 
accuracy on this indicator, but to put that to one side, the results for th case study 
countries all indicate that in all seven former Yugoslavia countries, the perception of corruption
is very high and plays a significant role in their overall unhappiness.
Finally, before moving to the analysis section, Table 6 presents the rankings for the case study 
countries (except Kosovo) on the GPI and WHR
Human Development Index (HDI) and Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI).46 
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The HDI is a composite measure of life expectancy, education and income per capita indicators.
By including 47 
Table VI in here
The HDI and IHDI rankings show that the former Yugoslavia countries concerned have achieved
either ( 
(Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Moreover, all of them score 
even better on the IHDI, particularly Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This confirms that 
when testing correlations
development indicators would not need to be considered as variables.
5. Analysis
The above review of WHR rankings for each of former Yugoslavia countries shows that the 
indices of Social Support, Freedom to Make Life Choices, Generosity and Perception of
Corruption are certainly worth investigating. But in order to do so, it is important to dig deeper 
into GPI score across the index three categories: Ongoing Domestic and
International Conflict (Indices 1-6), Societal Safety and Security (Indices 7-16), and Militarisation
(Indices 18-23). These are presented in Table 7.48 
Table VII in here
As far as the Militarisation indices are concerned, it seems the case study countries are quite 
peaceful; Slovenia, for one, is ranked as one of the most peaceful places in the world. Yet as the 
19 of 34
 
    
  
 
    
    
    
       
   
 
 
   
    
      
   
 
 






       
 
   
Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict indices show, several of those countries are clearly 
still dealing with the legacy of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing civil wars. This is
particularly the case for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Macedonia, meanwhile, long faced
an added challenge over a dispute with neighbouring Greece over its name, which was resolved
only in June 2018. Even Croatia and Slovenia still seem to be facing challenges even though they
have already joined the EU, with ongoing conflict issues supposedly resolved before their 
accession. Yet on the Societal Safety and Security category, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia all score 
well.
It is therefore worth focusing on these indices in particular. Based on the preceding review of
peacefulness for the seven case study countries, the question that really matters for this paper is
whether peacefulness has brought happiness to populations and whether the 
way peacefulness is measured by the GPI is sufficient to draw any conclusions about happiness
from it at all.
To start with the latter point, as has already been established, no such correlation is immediately 
visible. According to GPI 2018, amongst 36 European countries, the seven case study countries 
ranked as follows: Slovenia (7th), Croatia (19th), Serbia (27th), Montenegro (29th), Macedonia 
(33rd), Bosnia and Herzegovina (34th) and Kosovo (35th). Furthermore, three of the world eight 
largest improvements on GPI were achieved by Macedonia, Montenegro and Croatia. All of them
recorded improvements in Safety and Security; both Macedonia and Croatia experienced a
decline in external conflict. On the other hand, the population of Croatia, Slovenia and
Montenegro became unhappier between 2013 and 2018, while the other four countries saw no
significant improvement. This is particularly puzzling considering that the aforementioned three 
countries are the most developed of the seven according to the HDI 2017. Moreover, as shown
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in Table 6, all seven countries score even better in the Inequality-Adjusted HDI. It therefore
seems that low scores on the WHR do not necessarily have any relationship to income and its
distribution.
Next, let us turn to the WHR Social Support, Freedom to Make Life Choices,
Generosity, and Perception of Corruption. Some of the indices used for the Societal Safety and
 
Security category of the GPI (such as Level of Perceived Criminality, Political Instability, Level of
 
Violent Crime, Number of Police) appear to be re But comparing 
the two also highlights that the GPI does not include many social matters, a crucial dimension of
peacefulness. Given that four of the WH six indices are on social matters, and that they help 
provide an overall picture of happiness, it could be argued that those involved in planning post-
conflict responses should pay a particular attention to their findings.
This assertion should be considered alongside the work of Denskus who warned that
peacebuilding do - that is, 
that it often is not grounded in historical and socio-cultural contexts.49 
indices include genuinely matter, and greatly so whether conflict-affected people have family, 
friends and neighbours whom they can actually ask for help, whether they live in an
environment where people help each other by donating to charities, whether they feel that they 
have freedom of making life choices as they would like, whether or not they are exposed to 
corruption really matter for their happiness.
So if a post-
populations, then current practice an overall statebuilding strategy dominated by security and
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institutional reforms must be adjusted accordingly. It seems particularly important to focus not 
only on politics, security and economics, but also on social reconstruction.
A matter of social reconstruction?
Improvements in GDP, security and physical wellbeing after an armed conflict might well make a
positive impact on happiness in the short to mid-term, but once such improvements have been
internalised by populations in the long-term, their impact on overall happiness will likely prove
limited. It is clear that once a population has been freed from poverty and threats to security, 
relative prosperity and safety will become the everyday norms of post-conflict life;
their actual livin 
populations.50 In other words, these breakthroughs will contribute less and less towards
happiness over time. This can be observed by the changes in the seven countries happiness
ranking between 2005-2006 and 2014-2016.51 The relatively poorer and politically less stable 
countries of former Yugoslavia made much greater strides in their happiness results
Macedonia (13), Serbia (14), Bosnia and Herzegovina (40) and Kosovo (51) than the wealthier
ones. For Montenegro, the improvement was quite small (64); both Slovenia (76) and Croatia 
(108) saw their scores drop.52 
It could be argued that what is more decisive in the long term are
affecting happiness in peaceful societies: family relationships, community and friends, work 
environment, personal freedom, and personal values, as well as financial situation and health. 
According to Clark et al., the main determinants of happiness and misery are income, education, 
unemployment, partnership (marriage), physical health and mental health.53 Layard similarly 
points to
divorce rate, unemployment rate, level of trust, membership in non-religious organisations, 
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quality of government and fraction believing in God'.54 It is important to note that to a large 
extent, this is what six indices set out to measure particularly those related to social
context.
A matter of trust?
The WHR 2017 is particularly useful for shedding further light on this issue, as it explored the 
issues around social foundations of happiness. In a chapter written by Helliwell et al in this 
report, trust was taken as one of the key issues within the social foundations of happiness; the 
authors -trust communities and societies are happier places to live, even after 
allowing for the effects of higher incomes and better health 55 All the social and political factors
mentioned above help determine whether or not communities trust each other (horizontal
trust) and their governance (vertical trust). Helliwell et al offer an insightful observation on social
foundations and how they are affected by external calamities and economic crises, and their 
observations apply particularly well to post-conflict environments:56 
quality, lead to improvements rather than damage to the social fabric. These 
improvements not only ensure better responses to the crisis, but also have substantial
additional happiness returns, since people place real value on feeling that they belong to 
a caring and effective community.
Armed conflict and violence do not just kill and maim, destroy infrastructure and services, or 
wipe out opportunities for generations to come. They also divide societies and leave deep 
societal wounds, not least resentment, suspicion, fear and hatred. That means that in terms of a
is alleviated, including by
whom and to what end.
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It can be taken as a given that local societal context is one of the main determinants of such
outcomes, meaning it is difficult to come up with anything truly generalisable across even the 
former Yugoslavia countries. But in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo, the most badly 
war-affected of the seven, the social problems of the post-conflict context are all too clear. On
almost all the WHR four social criteria, Croatia ranks relatively low, as does Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The only significant difference between them is in generosity; this might be due to 
the varying size of their Muslim populations, since charity and almsgiving is a key element of 
Islamic religious practice. This hypothesis is bolstered by the fact that another Muslim majority
country, Kosovo, also has a high generosity score. However, when it comes to the perception of
corruption, all three countries rank very poorly, as do all the other former Yugoslavia countries.
This might be because of the way these seven countries still struggle to transform their
governance structures to tackle different types of corruption in their societies. With that in mind, 
the seven countries clearly share problems of trust both within social life and towards
governance.
A matter of social support?
On the issue of social support, it seems that both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina still suffer 
damaged societal relations. Largely thanks to the mass displacement that communities in both
countries experienced because of wartime ethnic cleansing, it seems many people are still bereft
of strong social support structures. On the other hand, out of the four social WHR indices, one of 
the most interesting results relates to freedom to make life choices. Apart from Slovenia, which
scores high, the case study countries score very low. Croatia and Montenegro are particularly 
puzzling examples, since both of them are relatively rich countries with good rule of law and
human rights records. Croatia is a member of the EU; as a further research question, it would be 
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worth investigating how a country like this can score so low on this ranking. But for the purposes
of this paper, the key concern is whether such trajectories indicated by the WHR indices have
anything to do with the way the reconstruction of the Western Balkans has been pursued over 
the last 20 years.
In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, Bojicic-Dzelilovic analyses the legacy of
m to peace and democracy. She 
concludes that -way ethnic division of the country, in
which ethnic criteria permeate every aspect of life, shapes distribution of power and resources
57 In this context, the peacebuilding process has to a large extent failed to foster
cohesive societal relations. Ethno-religious politics still dictate the way the three main
communities of Croats, Muslims and Serbs relate to each other. According to Mocnik, the 
Western Balkans countries are confronting
networks of social solidarity are faltering not only the institutions of the Welfare State, but also 
other more long-term social mechanisms like those of the extended family, neighbourhood, 
58 The external 
interventionist approach to the reconstruction of former Yugoslavia countries prioritised
building institutions over repairing community relations, and excluded ordinary people from the 
rebuilding of their own lives; it seems this may have helped allow social problems to fester. 
People in the conflict-affected communities of the Western Balkans have long since lost their
beloveds, friends, neighbours and community members to both death and displacement, and
the peacebuilding process has done little to heal their wounds in the years and decades since.59 
A matter of governance and economics?
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As to the harmonisation of societal relations and reconciliation of divided communities in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Eastmond argues that the wider economic and governance issues are also 
critical. According to her, as far as everyday life is concerned enemies
is not always the foremost preoccupation for people trying to make a new start after a 
60 While it that the peacebuilding process in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina achieved a lot eradicating major political violence, reconstructing 
infrastructure, and assisting in the return of displaced populations
describes in Bosnia and Herzegovina public 
rom the distance between the governing political elites and international 
61 In other words, peacebuilding 
in the former Yugoslavia countries has primarily been a matter of statebuilding, nation-building,
governance capacity, institution-building, compliance with policies introduced by external 
actors, the use of conditionality to drive through change, and so on. The process has not 
necessarily concerned itself with building bridges between conflicting families, neighbours and
communities. It is this latter view of social and transformational aspects that is, 
that is useful here.
Much has been written on the questionable value of local participation, which is often
prescribed as a remedy for all the ills of international peacebuilding responses.62 To romanticise
local participation in post-conflict efforts is often to ignore the realities of local power 
hierarchies, discrimination, partisanship and violence, all of which could easily negate the 
sustainability of peace.63 But on the other hand, it is still imperative to engage with conflict-
affected communities, particularly women and young people. They must be included to ensure 
that everyday peace is relevant to all segments of society; formal peacebuilding programmes
must create opportunities for their voices to be heard in the planning and implementation of
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such efforts.64 Brewer et al. argue that building peace should b 
65 It is through this particular kind of 
post-conflict transformation that everyday life and social processes particularly trust, solidarity, 
altruism, cohesion, integration and volunteerism might have a more realistic chance of 
improving in the long term.
6. Conclusion
If happiness is considered the ultimate goal in life, the corollary is that peace is as much an
instrumental good as are health, freedom and autonomy. This then implies that the 
contemporary practice of peacebuilding is due for an overhaul. If it were reframed with
happiness in mind, the goal of peacebuilding would no longer be simply creating a political, 
economic, and cultural environment that can stave off a return to armed conflict; instead, the 
goal would be to make sure the post-conflict population live in happiness. Whether this would
be a helpful framework for policy and practice is obviously open to debate, but to start the 
discussions here, the Greatest Happiness principle makes for a useful bottom
line. The debate could be further enriched by taking the WHR nto account, using it to
explore what contemporary peacebuilding strategies and programmes might look like with
happiness as their focal point.
At a first glance, this might seem just a tangle with the semantics peace and happiness 
latter might seem simply too confusing or nebulous a goal for complex peacebuilding 
responses. However, it is important to remember that beyond the absence of violence, peace is
nebulous too. Moreover, looking at the former Yugoslavia countries and their achievements, it 
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seems that there are legitimate grounds to start this debate. The discussions in this paper 
presented a number of important points to start setting some parameters.
First of all, the GPI of peacefulness and its import for everyday life has a number
of significant gaps, especially in relation to societal relations and governance. The WHR 
show potential as complementary indicators, offering a more insightful understanding of 
peacefulness. In fact, the evidence it points to suggests that happiness could even be a good
measure to fundamentally assess positive peace.
Second, the findings in this paper underline the importance of measuring what peacebuilding 
achieves in a mid-to-long term perspective as far as the ultimate goal of happiness is concerned. 
It is likely that the things peacebuilding can achieve in the short-to-mid term improvements in
security, income, general living standards and governance will
populations, meaning their expectations will adjust rapidly to their improved post-conflict 
circumstances, in turn influencing their perception of happiness. This could make a useful point 
of inquiry for researchers setting out to investigate the peace and happiness nexus more 
thoroughly.
institutions, infrastructure, services, systems, etc , i.e. societal relations, 
might also be due for reconsideration. While failed efforts to improve governance can help
foment unhappiness, as per the challenge of corruption in the former Yugoslavia, the WHR 
indices show that matters of societal trust (both horizontal and vertical) economic liberalism-
induced changes in state-civil society relations, solidarity, social support, justice and 
reconciliation, and freedom to make life choices all play a significant role in the way post­
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conflict societies perceive their happiness in the mid-to-long term. If happiness were taken as
the ultimate goal, contemporary peacebuilding approaches and methods would need to rethink 
their technocratic perspectives and pay a lot more attention to the way their implementations
are aligned with social needs. That means attending to the work of repairing, supporting and
enabling relationships in deeply divided environments.
and happiness. To understand how communities deal with the challenges of maintaining peace 
as part of their everyday lives, we must also examine what inter- and intra-group activities
achieve beyond avoiding and minimising conflict. The discussion here showed that everyday 
peace can contribute to overall happiness when it is inclusive; this would open up opportunities
to activate the agency of conflict-affected communities more comprehensively and effectively.
Another contributing factor appears to be the extent to which everyday peace activity is
connected and merged with its own socio-cultural, economic and political environment. A deep 
understanding of this process would be highly significant for any effort to address the needs of
post-conflict communities in the long term and therefore to contribute to their happiness.
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